Rule-based argumentation systems are developed for reasoning about defeasible information. They take as input a theory made of a set of facts, a set of strict rules, which encode strict information, and a set of defeasible rules which describe general behavior with exceptional cases. They build arguments by chaining such rules, define attacks between them, use a semantics for evaluating the arguments, and finally identify the plausible conclusions that follow from the theory.
Introduction
Argumentation is a promising approach for reasoning with conflicting information [2] . It consists of generating arguments, defining attacks between them, evaluating the arguments using a semantics, then identifying plausible conclusions.
In the computational argumentation literature, there are two families of semantics: extension semantics, initiated in [3] and further developed in several papers including [4, 5] , and ranking semantics, introduced in [6] . The first family looks
The defeasible rule lr ⇒ or is not applicable because the object is illuminated by a red light.
The argument B undercuts A and the conclusion (or) of A does not hold. Undercut deals with the exceptions of defeasible rules. Indeed, every exception of a defeasible rule gives birth to an attack from any argument concluding the exception toward any argument using the rule. In the example, being illuminated by a red light is a specific case where the rule lr ⇒ or cannot be applied.
In this paper, we show that undercut can do more than dealing with exceptions of defeasible rules. It can also perfectly play the role of rebuttal and assumption attack [20] , and deals thus with inconsistency in a theory. The basic idea is the following: any defeasible rule x ⇒ y should be blocked when ¬y follows from the theory. We propose the first rule-based argumentation system that uses undercutting as its single attack relation. We show that it satisfies the rationality postulates discussed in [18] under naive, complete, grounded, stable and preferred semantics. From a conceptual point of view, this system is much simpler than existing ones that combine rebuttal and undercut. Indeed, in order to satisfy the postulates, ASPIC requires one variant of rebuttal per semantics: unrestricted rebut is used under grounded semantics and restricted rebut is used under complete and preferred semantics. Our system satisfies the postulates under all semantics. Moreover, restricted rebut is based on an assumption which is not intuitive. Indeed, this relation compares only the rules whose heads are inconsistent, and neglects the remaining structure of the arguments. For instance, it considers that the argument (x 1 , x 1 ⇒ y 1 , y 1 → z) attacks the argument (x 2 , x 2 → y 2 , y 2 ⇒ ¬z) since z follows from a strict rule while ¬z follows from a defeasible one. Note that the converse is not true even if the first rule of the first argument is defeasible while that of the second argument is strict. Our system does not make such assumptions.
The second main contribution of the paper consists of providing the first and full characterizations of the extensions as well as the set of plausible conclusions of our system under all the semantics proposed in [3] . Indeed, we show one-to-one correspondences between extensions and sub-theories of the theory over which the argumentation system is built. We also show that the plausible conclusions are the formulas that follow from all the sub-theories characterizing the extensions under a given semantics. These correspondences ensure the correctness and completeness of the outcomes of the proposed system. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the rule-based system we are interested in. Section 3 analyses its properties, namely it shows that the system satisfies the existing rationality postulates as well as a new one. Section 4 charac-terizes its outputs (extensions and plausible conclusions), and Section 5 compares it with existing rule-based systems and concludes.
Rule-based argumentation system
As in any paper in defeasible reasoning (e.g. [21, 22, 23] ), three kinds of information are distinguished: Facts representing factual information like 'Tweety is a bird', strict rules representing general information which do not have exceptions like 'Penguins do not fly' and defeasible rules describing general behaviors with exceptional cases like 'Birds fly'. In other words, any rule which has exceptions is considered as defeasible.
In what follows, L is a set of literals, i.e. atoms or negation of atoms, representing knowledge. The negation of an atom x from L is denoted by ¬x. L ′ is a set of atoms used for naming rules. The two sets satisfy the constraint L ∩ L ′ = ∅. Every rule has a single name and two rules cannot have the same name. Throughout the paper, rules are named r, r 1 , r 2 , . . . . The function Rule(r i ) returns the rule whose name is r i .
Facts are elements of L.
Defeasible rules are of the form x 1 , . . . , x n ⇒ x and x, x 1 ..., x n are literals in L. Such rules are read as follows: If x 1 , . . . , x n hold, then generally x holds as well.
Strict rules are of the form x 1 , . . ., x n → x where x 1 , . . ., x n are literals of L and x ∈ L or x ∈ L ′ and Rule(x) is defeasible.
These rules are read as follows: If x 1 , . . . , x n hold, then always x holds as well.
Note that defeasible rules may have an empty body, i.e. the set {x 1 ..., x n } may be empty. However, strict rules are not allowed to have empty bodies. The reason is that a strict rule with an empty body represents a fact and thus a factual information and not a general behavior with no exceptions. Furthermore, the names of rules cannot appear in bodies of (strict or defeasible) rules. This means that it is not possible to represent information of the form "if rule r is applied (or is blocked), then y holds". We also assume that a strict rule cannot be blocked since it represents certain information (i.e., if its body holds, then necessarily its head holds as well). Things are different with defeasible rules. By default, any defeasible rule can be applied, unless explicitly mentioned in the language by strict rules. Indeed, a strict rule x 1 , . . ., x n → x with x ∈ L ′ is read as follows: If x 1 , . . . , x n hold, then the defeasible rule x is always not applicable.
Definition 1 (Theory).
A theory is a triple T = (F, S, D) where F ⊆ L is a set of facts, and S ⊆ L ′ (respectively D ⊆ L ′ ) is a set of strict (defeasible) rule names.
It is worth pointing out that the two sets S and D contain names of rules and not the rules themselves.
Notations: For each rule x 1 , . . . , x n → x (as well as x 1 , . . . , x n ⇒ x) whose name is r, the head of the rule is Head(r) = x and the body of the rule is Body(r) = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. Let T = (F, S, D) and T ′ = (F ′ , S ′ , D ′ ) be two theories. We say that T is a sub-theory of T ′ , written T ⊑ T ′ , iff F ⊆ F ′ and S ⊆ S ′ and D ⊆ D ′ . The relation ❁ is the strict version of ⊑ (i.e., it is the case that at least one of the three inclusions is strict). Finally, let Defs(T ) = D.
We show how new information is produced from a given theory. This is generally the case when (strict and/or defeasible) rules are fired in a derivation schema. r 1 ) , . . . , (x n , r n ) such that:
Definition 2 (Derivation schema). Let
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, x i ∈ F and r i = ∅, or r i ∈ S ∪ D and Head(r i ) = x i and Body(r i ) ⊆ {x 1 , ..,
CN(T ) denotes the set of all literals that have a derivation schema from T .
It is clear from the definition that CN is monotonic.
be a theory such that F 1 = {p, b}, S 1 = {r 1 } and D 1 = {r 2 } where Rule(r 1 ) = p → ¬f and Rule(r 2 ) = b ⇒ f . From T 1 , we have the following minimal derivations:
A notion of consistency and another of coherence are associated with this logical language.
Definition 3 (Consistency-Coherence
The set of strict rules should be closed under transposition. However, only rules whose head is an element of L (i.e., not a name of a rule) are transposed. Transposition is required for ensuring the rationality postulates proposed in [18] .
Definition 4 (Closure under transposition).
A transposition of a strict rule x 1 , . . ., x n → x, with x ∈ L, is a strict rule x 1 , . . ., x i−1 , ¬x, x i+1 , . . ., x n → ¬x i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let S be a set of strict rules' names. We define Cl t (S) as the minimal set such that:
S ⊆ Cl t (S), and
If r ∈ Cl t (S) and Rule(r ′ ) is a transposition of Rule(r) then r ′ ∈ Cl t (S).
We say that S is closed under transposition iff Cl t (S) = S.
Throughout the paper, we will consider undercut for capturing all the possible conflicts between arguments. Thus, undercut will be used both for blocking general rules in presence of exceptions of these rules, and also for handling inconsistency. For that purpose, for each defeasible rule whose name is r, the theory should contain the name of the strict rule ¬Head(r) → r. The latter is read as follows: if ¬Head(r) follows from a theory, then the rule r should be blocked. This closure captures simply the fact that the two literals Head(r) and ¬Head(r) cannot hold at the same time.
Definition 5 (Closed theory). A theory T = (F, S, D) is closed iff

S is closed under transposition, and
for every r ∈ D such that Head(r) = x, it holds that r ′ ∈ S with Rule(r ′ ) = ¬x → r. 4 } where Rule(r 1 ) = p → ¬f , Rule(r 3 ) = f → ¬p, and Rule(r 4 ) = ¬f → r 2 .
The backbone of an argumentation system is naturally the notion of arguments. They are built from a closed theory using the notion of derivation schema.
Definition 6 (Argument
Unlike ASPIC and ASPIC+ systems, arguments are minimal in our system. This definition of argument is more akin with the intuitive idea that an argument is a logical proof of a conclusion.
An argument may have several sub-parts, each of which is called sub-argument.
Notations: Arg(T ) denotes the set of all arguments built from theory T in the sense of Definition 6. If a = (d, x) is an argument, Conc(a) = x and Sub(a) is the set of all its sub-arguments. For a set E of arguments, Concs(E) = {x | (d, x) ∈ E} and Th(E) is a theory such that:
The undercutting relation is defined as follows:
Let us illustrate this relation by some examples.
Example 1 (Cont)
The set Arg(T ′ 1 ) contains:
a 4 undercuts both a 5 and a 6 since r 2 ∈ Def(d 5 ) and r 2 ∈ Def(d 6 ).
Obviously, strict arguments cannot be attacked using this relation.
Note that self-attacking arguments may exist.
Example 2. Consider the closed theory
The set Arg(T 2 ) contains the three arguments:
The argument a 3 undercuts itself and a 2 .
Throughout the paper, we study the following rule-based argumentation system.
Definition 9 (AS). An argumentation system (AS) defined over a closed theory
and R u is defined according to Definition 8.
Arguments are evaluated using extension-based semantics proposed by Dung is his seminal paper [3] . These semantics are based on two key notions:
Conflict-freeness:
A set E of arguments is conflict-free iff ∄a, b ∈ E such that aR u b.
Defence: A set E of arguments defends an argument a iff for any argument b such that bR u a, ∃c ∈ E such that cR u b.
Let us now recall the semantics that will be used for evaluating the arguments of any argumentation system (in the sense of Definition 9). Definition 10 (Semantics). Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system defined over a closed theory T , and let E ⊆ Arg(T ).
E is a naive extension iff it is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) conflict-free subset of Arg(T ).
E is a complete extension iff it is a conflict-free set which defends all its elements and contains any argument it defends.
E is a preferred extension iff it is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) complete extension.
E is a stable extension iff E is conflict-free and ∀a ∈ Arg(T ) \ E, ∃b ∈ E such that bR u a.
E is a grounded extension iff it the minimal (with respect to set inclusion) complete extension.
Notations:
Ext y (H) denotes the set of all extensions of system H under semantics y where y ∈ {n, p, s, c, g}, n (respectively p, s, c, g) stands for naive (respectively preferred, stable, complete, grounded).
It is worth recalling that an argumentation system may not have stable extensions, and it has a single grounded extension.
The extensions of a system are used for defining the plausible conclusions to be drawn from the theory over which the system is built. A literal is a plausible conclusion iff it is a common conclusion to all the extensions. Note that a similar definition was used in [18] for drawing conclusions with ASPIC system.
Definition 11 (Plausible conclusions).
Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over a closed theory T = (F, S, D). The set of plausible conclusions of H under semantics y (y ∈ {n, p, s, c, g}) is
It is worth noticing that an argumentation system aims at weakening the inference power of the consequence operator CN from which the system is built. Indeed, the inclusion Output y (H) ⊆ CN(T ) holds. As we will see later, when the theory T is consistent and coherent the equality Output y (H) = CN(T ) holds under any of the recalled semantics. Note also that when the argumentation system has no extensions, it does not recommend any conclusion as plausible.
Example 1 (Cont)
The argumentation system H 1 = (Arg(T ′ 1 ), R u ) has a single stable extension which is also preferred:
Example 2 (Cont) The argumentation system H 2 = (Arg(T 2 ), R u ) has a single preferred extension: E = {a 1 } and thus Output p (H 2 ) = {p}. However under stable semantics,
Remark: One may wonder why admissible semantics is not investigated in this paper. The main reason is that, as shown by Dung himself in his paper [3] , the emptyset is an admissible extension of any argumentation system. Consequently, according to Definition 11, the set of plausible conclusions of any argumentation system is always empty (Output(H) = ∅) whatever the theory at hand. Even if the theory T = (F, S, D) over which the system is built is consistent, the system will not be able to infer any conclusion, missing thus intuitive conclusions. This shows that admissible semantics is not suitable for defeasible reasoning.
Satisfaction of rationality postulates
Let us now analyze the properties of the argumentation system defined in the previous section. We show that it satisfies all the rationality postulates proposed in [18] , namely consistency, indirect consistency, and closure under strict rules. Recall that indirect inconsistency follows from the two other postulates.
Under complete, grounded, preferred and stable semantics, every extension returns a consistent set of conclusions (unless the strict part of the theory is inconsistent) and the set of conclusions of every extension is closed under strict rules, that is, it is not possible that an extension supports a conclusion x and forgets y if x → y ∈ S. However, both properties are violated under naive semantics. This is not surprising since naive semantics does not take into account the orientation of attacks, and thus the distinction between strict and defeasible rules is neglected. Theorem 1. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over a closed theory T = (F, S, D) such that Ext y (H) = ∅ with y ∈ {s, p, c, g}. For any E ∈ Ext y (H), the following two properties hold:
(Consistency)
Concs(E) = CN((Concs(E), S, ∅)).
(Closure under strict rules)
The following properties follow from the previous theorem. 
In [18, 24] another desirable property, closure under sub-arguments, was discussed. It states that every extension should contain all the sub-arguments of its arguments. Hopefully, our system satisfies this property under all the reviewed semantics. It also satisfies a novel property of coherence, which ensures that it is not possible for an extension to use a defeasible rule in one of its arguments, and at the same time to block that rule by another argument.
For any E ∈ Ext y (H), the following two properties hold:
(Closure under sub-arguments)
The theory Th(E) is coherent. (Coherence)
The previous results show that the outcomes of the new argumentation system (its extensions and set of plausible conclusions) satisfy nice properties under grounded, complete, stable and preferred semantics. However, they do not say anything about the kind of conclusions the system draws from a theory. We answer this question in the next section in which we provide full characterizations of the system's outcomes.
Formal characterization of extensions and plausible conclusions
This section provides formal characterizations of the outcomes of the system under the five reviewed semantics. For each semantics, we characterize the extensions in terms of sub-theories of the theory over which the system is built. Indeed, we show one-to-one correspondences between extensions (under a given semantics) and particular sub-theories of the theory over which the system is built. In other words, we show that extensions and those sub-theories are the two faces of the same coin. We also delimit the number of extensions, and characterize the set of plausible conclusions. As we will see an argumentation system may return different results under the studied semantics.
Naive semantics
A sub-theory that corresponds to a naive extension is called naive option. A naive option represents the possible states of the world that may be reached in a theory. Formally, it is a maximal (for set inclusion) sub-theory of the initial theory that considers all the facts and all the strict and defeasible rules that are applicable (i.e., their bodies hold).
Definition 12 (Naive option). A naive option of a closed theory
T = (F, S, D) is a sub-theory (F ′ , S ′ , D ′ ) such that F ′ = F, S ′ ⊆ S and D ′ ⊆ D (F ′ , S ′ , D ′ ) is coherent ∀r ∈ S ′ ∪ D ′ , Body(r) ⊆ CN((F ′ , S ′ , D ′ )) ∄S ′′ , D ′′ such that (F ′ , S ′ , D ′ ) ❁ (F ′ , S ′′ , D ′′ ) and (F ′ , S ′′ , D ′′ ) satisfies the previous conditions.
NOpt(T ) denotes the set of naive options of the closed theory T .
Thus, a naive option is obtained by taking all the facts and a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) subset of (strict and defeasible) rules so that the sub-theory remains coherent and all the added rules are applicable. Notice that no priority is given to strict rules over defeasible ones. This is explained by the fact that naive semantics does not distinguish between attackers and attacked arguments.
Example 3. Consider the closed version of theory
and Rule(r 6 ) = s → r 3 . The theory T 3 has three naive options:
Let us now establish the relationship between the naive extensions of an argumentation system and the naive options of the closed theory over which the system is built. Each naive extension returns one naive option and two naive extensions cannot return the same naive option. For any E ∈ Ext n (H), there exists a single naive option O ∈ NOpt(T ) such
For any E ∈ Ext n (H), E = Arg(NOption(E)).
The following theorem shows that inversely, each naive option leads to one naive extension and two different naive options cannot return the same naive extension.
Let us illustrate the two results on the running example.
Example 3 (Cont)
The arguments built from T 3 are summarized below.
The graph of attacks is depicted in Figure 1 . It is easy to check that the argumentation system H 3 = (Arg(T 3 ), R u ) has three naive extensions:
The previous results show a bijection between naive options and naive extensions. Since any argumentation system always admits at least one naive extension (since at least arguments of the form (p, ∅) where p ∈ F are not attacked), a closed theory admits at least one naive option (unless the set of facts is empty). The number of naive extensions is delimited as follows.
The plausible conclusions of an argumentation system under naive semantics are the literals that follow from all the naive options of the theory over which the system is built. Formally:
To conclude, under naive semantics, a rule-based argumentation system infers the literals that follow from all the options of the closed theory over which the system is built.
Stable semantics
The purpose of this section is to characterize the extensions as well as the set of plausible conclusions of the system described in this paper under stable semantics. As we will show later, the sub-theories of a closed theory that capture stable extensions are called stable options and are defined as follows:
Definition 13 (Stable Option). A stable option of a closed theory
SOpt(T ) denotes the set of stable options of theory T .
The strict rules of a stable option O = (F, S, D ′ ) are not necessarily all applicable. Let S ′′ be the subset of strict rules that are applicable in O, i.e., S ′′ = {r ∈ S | Body(r) ⊆ CN(O)}. Then, the sub-theory
In addition, every strict (respectively defeasible) rule r which is kept outside O ′ is not applicable (respectively is not applicable or is such that r ∈ CN(O ′ )). The latter constraint does not hold necessarily for every naive option. Accordingly, every stable option corresponds to a single naive option but the converse is not true. Thus, in addition to an "internal condition" (coherence) satisfied by both naive options and stable options, the latter require an additional "external condition" which consists of justifying each rule kept outside. Notice, that this idea is not new in non-monotonic reasoning. We find it namely in the distinction between Reiter's extensions [25] and Lukaszewicz's extensions [26] in default logic as well as between answer sets [27] and ι-answer sets [28] in logic programming. Let us illustrate stable options and their relationship with naive options.
Example 3 (Cont)
The closed theory T 3 has one stable option O = (F 3 , S 3 , {r 2 }).
Note that the only strict rule in S 3 which is applicable for O is r 5 . If we discard from O the remaining non-applicable strict rules, we get exactly the naive option O n2 and CN(O) = CN(O n2 ). Note also that each rule which is not included in O n2 is justified. Namely, the strict rules r 4 and r 6 are note applicable (t ∈ Body(r 4 ), t / ∈ CN(O n2 ), s ∈ Body(r 6 ), and s / ∈ CN(O n2 )); the defeasible rule r 1 is such that r 1 ∈ CN(O n2 ) and the defeasible rule r 3 is not applicable (t ∈ Body(r 3 ) and t / ∈ CN(O n2 )). So O n2 gives rise to a stable option by adding all the non-applicable strict rules. This is not the case for O n0 and O n1 . Indeed, adding the missing strict rules to them leads to incoherent sub-theories.
It is worthy to say that a closed theory may not have stable options. This is not surprising since as we will show, there is a bijection between the set of stable extensions and the set of stable options. Indeed, every stable extension gives birth to a stable option and two stable extensions cannot return the same stable option. 
For any
For any E ∈ Ext s (H), E = Arg(SOption(E)).
Inversely, every stable option leads to one stable extension and two stable options cannot lead to the same stable extension. 
Example 3 (Cont) Among the three naive extensions of the argumentation system H 3 built from T 3 , the only stable extension is E 2 = {a 1 , a 2 , a 5 , a 6 } which captures the stable option O = (F 3 , S 3 , {r 2 }). Indeed, Th(E 2 ) ⊑ O and Concs(E 2 ) = CN(O).
We have seen so far that there is a one to one correspondence between naive (respectively stable) extensions and naive options (respectively stable options). We have also shown that every stable option is a sub-theory of one naive option. Thus, the number of stable extensions of a rule-based system is delimited as follows.
Corollary 4.
Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over a closed theory T . The following inequalities hold:
Under stable semantics, the plausible conclusions of an argumentation system are the literals that follow from all the stable options of the theory over which the system is built. Let us summarize: The rule-based argumentation system defined in the previous section may not have stable extensions, in which case it may miss intuitive conclusions like facts. When the system has stable extensions, it returns exactly the literals that follow from all the stable options of the closed theory at hand.
Preferred semantics
Preferred semantics was proposed in [3] in order to palliate the limit of stable semantics which does not guarantee the existence of extensions. The family of argumentation systems we are investigating in this paper suffers from this drawback. Preferred semantics guarantees extensions. We show next that the sub-theories that capture preferred extensions are the so-called preferred options.
Definition 14 (Preferred Option). A preferred option of a closed theory T = (F, S, D) is a sub-theory (F
′ , S ′ , D ′ ) s.t. F ′ = F, S ′ = S and D ′ ⊆ D (F ′ , S ′ , D ′ ) is coherent ∀r ∈ D ′ , Body(r) ⊆ CN((F ′ , S ′ , D ′ )) ∀D ′′ ⊆ D, if ∃r ′ ∈ D ′ such that r ′ ∈ CN(F, S, D ′′ ) then ∃r ′′ ∈ D ′′ such that r ′′ ∈ CN(F, S, D ′ ) ∄D ′′ such that D ′ ⊂ D ′′ and (F ′ , S ′ , D ′′ ) satisfies the previous conditions.
POpt(T ) denotes the set of preferred options of theory T .
Example 3 (Cont)
Consider again the closed theory T 3 . There are three subtheories of T 3 that satisfy the first four conditions of Definition 16:
The maximal ones (that satisfy also the last condition of Definition 16) are Op 1 and Op 2 . Notice that Op 1 is exactly the unique stable option of T 3 . The other preferred option Op 2 captures a sub-part of the naive option O 2 = (F 3 , {r 4 }, {r 1 , r 3 }). Indeed, by keeping in Op 2 only the strict rues that are applicable we obtain: Op ′ 2 = (F 3 , {r 4 }, {r 1 }). We have :
The following theorem shows that every preferred extension leads to a single preferred option.
Theorem 7.
Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over a closed theory T .
For any E ∈ Ext p (H), there exists a single preferred option O ∈ POpt(T )
s.t. Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O). We define POption(E)
For any E ∈ Ext p (H), E = Arg(POption(E)).
Inversely, every preferred option corresponds to a single preferred extension and two preferred options cannot return the same preferred extension.
Theorem 8. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over a closed theory T . For any O ∈ POpt(T ), Arg(O) ∈ Ext p (H).
For any O ∈ POpt(T ), O = POption(Arg(O)).
For all
O 1 , O 2 ∈ POpt(T ), if Arg(O 1 ) = Arg(O 2 ) then O 1 = O 2 .
Example 3 (Cont)
The argumentation system H 3 constructed from the theory T 3 has two preferred extensions:
They capture the preferred options Op 1 and Op 2 respectively. Indeed, Th(Ep 1 ) ⊑ Op 1 (resp. Th(Ep 2 ) ⊑ Op 2 ) and Concs(Ep 1 ) = CN(Op 1 ) (resp. Concs(Ep 2 ) = CN(Op 2 )).
The number of preferred extensions of an argumentation system H is exactly the number of preferred options of the closed theory over which the system is built.
Corollary 6. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over a closed theory T . The following property holds:
The plausible conclusions of an argumentation system, under preferred semantics, are the literals that follow from all the preferred options of the theory at hand. 
CN(O).
Example 3 (Cont)
Unlike stable semantics, facts are always plausible consequences under preferred semantics.
Complete semantics
Let us now define the sub-theories corresponding to complete extensions, we call them complete options.
Definition 15 (Complete Option). A complete option of a closed theory T = (F, S, D) is a sub-theory (F
′ , S ′ , D ′ ) s.t. F ′ = F, S ′ = S and D ′ ⊆ D (F ′ , S ′ , D ′ ) is coherent ∀r ∈ D ′ , Body(r) ⊆ CN((F ′ , S ′ , D ′ )) ∀D ′′ ⊆ D, if ∃r ′ ∈ D ′ such that r ′ ∈ CN(F, S, D ′′ ) then ∃r ′′ ∈ D ′′ such that r ′′ ∈ CN(F, S, D ′ ) ∀r / ∈ D ′ , ∀D 1 ⊆ D such that r ∈ D 1 and Body(r) ⊆ CN(F, S, D 1 ), ∃D ′′ ⊆ D, D 1 ∩ CN(F, S, D ′′ ) = ∅ and ∀r ′′ ∈ D ′′ , r ′′ / ∈ CN(F ′ , S ′ , D ′ )
COpt(T ) denotes the set of complete options of theory T .
Example 3 (Cont)
Consider again the closed theory T 3 . There are three complete options of T 3 :
Let us show for instance that Oc 0 is a complete option of T 3 . The first four conditions are clearly satisfied. Let us show that the fifth condition holds for the three rules We show that every complete extension leads to a complete option and two complete extensions cannot return the same complete option.
Theorem 9.
For any E ∈ Ext c (H), there exists a single complete option O ∈ COpt(T ) such that Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O). Let COption(E)
For any E ∈ Ext c (H), E = Arg(COption(E)).
Inversely, every complete option corresponds to a single complete extension and two complete options cannot return the same complete extension.
Theorem 10.
For any O ∈ COpt(T ), Arg(O) ∈ Ext c (H).
For any
O ∈ COpt(T ), O = COption(Arg(O)). For all O 1 , O 2 ∈ COpt(T ), if Arg(O 1 ) = Arg(O 2 ) then O 1 = O 2 .
Example 3 (Cont)
The argumentation system H 3 constructed from T 3 has three complete extensions: From the bijection between the set of complete extensions and the set of complete options, it follows that the number of complete extensions of an argumentation system H is exactly the number of complete options of the theory over which the system is built.
Corollary 8. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over a closed theory T . It holds that
The plausible conclusions of an argumentation system, under complete semantics, are the literals that follow from all the complete options of the theory at hand.
Corollary 9.
Grounded semantics
We introduce in this section the sub-theory, called grounded option, which corresponds to the grounded extension of an argumentation system. It is the minimal (for set inclusion) complete option.
Definition 16 (Grounded Option). The grounded option of a closed theory T = (F, S, D) is the sub-theory (F
′ , S ′ , D ′ ) such that (F ′ , S ′ , D ′ ) is a complete option, ∄D ′′ ⊂ D ′ such that (F ′ , S ′ , D ′′ ) is a complete option.
GOpt(T ) denotes the grounded option of theory T .
Example 3 (Cont)
There are three complete options of T 3 : Oc 0 = (F 3 , S 3 , ∅), Oc 1 = (F 3 , S 3 , {r 2 }) and Oc 2 = (F 3 , S 3 , {r 1 }). Clearly, Oc 3 is the grounded option (i.e., GOpt(T 3 ) = Oc 3 ) since it has the minimal (wrt set inclusion) set of defeasible rules. Now, let us show that the grounded extension leads to the grounded option, and from the grounded option, one can get the grounded extension.
Theorem 11. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over a closed theory T . Let E be the grounded extension of H. The following two properties hold.
Th(E) ⊑ GOpt(T ) and Concs(E) = CN(GOpt(T )). E = Arg(GOpt(T )).
Example 3 (Cont)
The grounded extension of the system H 3 constructed from T 3 is: E = {a 1 , a 2 }. It captures the grounded option The plausible conclusions of an argumentation system, under grounded semantics, are the literals that follow from the grounded option of the theory at hand.
Corollary 10. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over a closed theory T . Output g (H) = CN(GOpt(T )).
Example 3 (Cont) Output g (H 3 ) = CN(Oc 3 ) = {x, y}.
Relationships between the different kinds of options and their outputs
From the one to one correspondences established in theorems 3-11, it follows that the same well-known relationships between the extensions of the five semantics exist between the five families of options. Figure 2 depicts the relationships between the different kinds of options and their outputs. A plain (respectively dotted) arrow from X-Option to Y-Options means that every X option is a Y Option (respectively Output X (.) ⊆ Output Y (.)).
Conclusion
There are a couple of rule-based argumentation systems in the literature. Some of them like ASPIC and its extended version ASPIC+ are shown to satisfy the rationality postulates defined in [18] , namely the consistency and closure under strict rules of their sets of plausible conclusions. While this is testimony to some strength of these formalisms, it does not say anything about the kind of plausible conclusions they draw from a theory. Surprisingly, the outputs of these systems (their extensions and their plausible conclusions) have never been characterized. The authors of those systems provide only examples to show that the outputs are meaningful. This is certainly not sufficient. Our paper is the first that attempts a systematic study of the outcomes of rule-based systems under naive, grounded, complete, stable and preferred semantics. There are two notable exceptions. The first work, done in [21] , considered a fragment of our logical language and rebuttal as attack relation. Blocking rules was not allowed. Extensions were characterized in terms of sub-theories. However, some sub-theories may not have corresponding extensions. Thus, there is no bijection between the two. Our formalism is thus more general and our characterizations of its outcomes are more accurate since they are one-to-one correspondences. The second work, done in [29, 30] , investigated the link between logic programming semantics and argumentation ones. The theory over which an argumentation system is built is a logic program, that is, only one type of rules is used. The paper shows that Dung's semantics have counterparts in logic programming. Another well-known argumentation system is ABA [2] . Unlike all other rule-based argumentation systems, the initial version of ABA is not based on the notion of argument. It manipulates sets of assumptions and the attack relation is between pairs of assumption sets. In [31] , the authors proposed an equivalent version which makes use of arguments. The logical language considered in ABA is different from ours since it uses assumptions while in our paper we do not. As argued in [32] , ABA does not satisfy in general the consistency postulate while our system satisfies all the postulates proposed in [18] . Finally, we fully characterized the plausible conclusions of our system under various semantics while such characterization is not available for ABA. In [33] another system was proposed for reasoning about stratified default theories. Like the initial version of ABA, the system is not based on the notion of argument thus somehow different from our approach. It allows subsets of a theory to attack a given default. Stable semantics was used for solving the conflicts. Unlike our paper, no characterization results are provided. However, the authors have shown that their system satisfies basic properties of a nonmonotonic consequence relation such as deduction, conditioning, and cumulativity.
In addition to the characterizations of the system's outcomes, the other main novelty of our paper is the exclusive use of undercut for encoding conflicts between arguments. This relation is always coupled with rebuttal and/or assumption attack which handle inconsistency in other systems. In our paper, we have shown that undercut is powerful enough to perfectly fulfill the role of rebuttal. Indeed, the characterization results show that extensions under any of the reviewed semantics are consistent and coherent sub-theories. This means that they do not contain pairs of arguments which are in conflict wrt one of the two relations. Furthermore, the maximality for set inclusion in case of naive, preferred and stable semantics suggests that not only all possible conflicts are captured but are also correctly solved. Finally, the system satisfies all the rationality postulates under any semantics while in ASPIC and ASPIC+, for each semantics, one should use a different definition of rebuttal (restricted vs unrestricted) in order to satisfy the postulates.
Regarding the definition of undercut, there are three proposals in the literature which are all equivalent. The first definition is the one followed in our paper and in [12] . The idea is to assign a name to every defeasible rule and to allow these names to be in heads of other rules. Unlike in [12] , in our paper, names of rules may only be in heads of strict rules. The reason is that undercut shows exceptions of defeasible rules, and exceptions are certain information. For instance, in case of penguin, the rule "birds fly" is not applicable. The second proposal, given in [19] and followed in [18] , uses an objectivation operator which transforms any defeasible rule into a literal. The latter plays the role of the name of the rule in our system. The last definition, proposed in [34, 35, 36] , extends the logical language by a new form of rules with which one can block defeasible rules. Whatever the definition is, none of these systems characterized its outcomes. This work will be extended in two ways. First, we will consider weighted theories, i.e., theories in which defeasible rules may not have the same importance. Second, we plan to use ranking semantics [6] for evaluating arguments. Such semantics were already used in argumentation systems developed for handling inconsistency in propositional knowledge bases [37] . The results show that they lead to more discriminating results than those of extension semantics. Furthermore, the argumentation approach goes beyond the maximal consistent subbases computed by the well-known coherence-based approach [38] . F, S, ∅) ).
Proof of Proposition 1. Follows immediately from the fact that
Proof of Theorem 1. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over theory T = (F, S, D). Assume that Ext(H) = ∅ and let E ∈ Ext(H). Closure under strict rules: Let E ∈ Ext c (H). Assume that x ∈ CN((Concs(E), S, ∅)) and x / ∈ Concs(E). Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } be the minimal for set inclusion subset of Concs(E) such that x ∈ CN((X, S, ∅)). For each x i , there exists a i ∈ E such that Conc(a i ) = x i . There exists a minimal derivation schema for x using a 1 , . . . , a n and additional strict rules. Let d be that derivation. (d, x) is an argument and (d, x) / ∈ E. There are two cases:
Thus, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Conc(b) ∈ Def(a i ), i.e., bR u a i . This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free. x) ) and a i ∈ E. Since E defends its elements, then E attacks b. Since preferred, grounded and stable extensions are complete, then the property holds under those semantics as well. Consistency: Let E ∈ Ext y (H) where y ∈ {p, s, g, c}, and assume that Concs(E) is inconsistent. Thus, ∃a,
If a and b are both strict (i.e., Def(d) = ∅ and Def(d ′ ) = ∅), then CN((F, S, ∅)) is inconsistent. Assume now that CN((F, S, ∅)) is consistent. It follows that a or/and b is defeasible (i.e., Def(d) = ∅ or/and Def(d ′ ) = ∅). Assume that a is defeasible. If r n ∈ D, then Name(¬x → r n ) ∈ S (since T is closed). Since E is closed under strict rules and ¬x ∈ Concs(E), then r n ∈ Concs(E). Thus, CN(Th(E)) ∩ Defs(Th(E)) = ∅. This contradicts the fact that Th(E) is coherent by Theorem 2. Assume now that r n / ∈ D. Let r i ∈ Def(d) be such that for all j > i, r j is either a fact or a strict rule. By definition of a derivation, r n ∈ S. Let r n = y 1 , . . . , y l → x. Since S is closed under contraposition, then for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l, Name(y 1 , . . . , y j−1 , y j+1 , . . . , y l → ¬y j ) ∈ S. Moreover, there exists a minimal sub-derivation d j of d for each y j . Thus,
is a derivation of ¬y j . Since arguments are minimal, then (X j , ¬y j ) ∈ Arg(T ).
Note that (d i , y i ) ∈ Sub(a). Since H is closed under sub-arguments, then (d i , y i ) ∈ E and thus y i ∈ Concs(E). Since H is closed under strict rules, ¬y j ∈ Concs(E) for all j = 1, . . . , l.
The same reasoning holds for each strict rule y 1 , . . . , y l → y between r i and r n . Indeed, ¬y i ∈ Concs(E) for all i = 1, . . . , l. By definition of derivation, there exists a strict rule r after r i such that Head(r i ) ∈ Body(r) thus ¬Head(r i ) ∈ Concs(E). Thus, Name(¬Head(r i ) → r i ) ∈ S. Since H is closed under strict rules, r i ∈ Concs(E). But, r i ∈ Defs(E) (since r i ∈ Def(d)). This contradicts the fact that Th(E) is coherent by Theorem 2. Indirect consistency: If CN((F, S, ∅) ) is inconsistent, we have seen that consistency is violated, i.e., there exists at least one extension E such that Concs(E) is inconsistent. Since by monotony of CN, Concs(E) ⊆ CN(Concs(E)). Hence, CN(Concs(E)) is inconsistent, and indirect consistency is violated. Assume now that CN((F, S, ∅)) is consistent. From previous result, consistency is satisfied. We know also that closure under strict rules is satisfied. Then, indirect consistency is satisfied, since it was shown in [18] that indirect consistency follows from Consistency and Closure under strict rules.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over theory T = (F, S, D). Assume that Ext(H) = ∅ and let E ∈ Ext(H). Coherence: Assume that ∃x ∈ Concs(E) ∩ Defs(Th(E)). Thus, x ∈ L ′ . Moreover, ∃a, b ∈ E such that Conc(a) = x and x ∈ Defs({b}). Then, aR u b. This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free. Closure under sub-arguments:
Consequently, cR u a. This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
Assume now that E ∈ Ext n (H), then E ∪ {b} is conflicting. Then, there exists c ∈ E such that cR u b or bR u c. Assume that bR u c. Then x ′ ∈ L ′ . Since elements of L ′ cannot be in the body of any rule then a = b, thus aR u c. This contradicts the fact that it is conflict-free. Assume now that cR u b. As above, it follows that cR u a and this contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
Assume now that E ∈ Ext c (H). Since b / ∈ E then there are two cases: i) E ∪{b} is conflicting, i.e., there exists c ∈ E such that cR u b or bR u c. As above, we get either cR u a or aR u c. In both cases, E is not conflict-free and this contradicts the fact that it is a complete extension. ii) E does not defend b. Thus, there exists c = (d ′′ , x ′′ ) ∈ Arg(T ) such that cR u b. Then, x ′′ ∈ Def(d ′ ) and thus x ′′ ∈ Def(d) meaning that cR u a. Since E is a complete extension ∃d ∈ E such that dR u c. Thus, E defends b. Since grounded and preferred extensions are complete, then the property holds under the two semantics as well.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be an argumentation system built over a closed theory T = (F, S, D) s.t. Ext(H) = ∅. Assume that Output(H) is inconsistent then ∃x, ¬x ∈ Output(H). Thus, for all E ∈ Ext(H), x, ¬x ∈ Concs(E). From Theorem 1, this is only possible if CN((F, S, ∅) ) is inconsistent.
Since CN is monotonic, Output(H) ⊆ CN((Output(H), S, ∅)). Let x ∈ CN((Output(H), S, ∅)) and assume that x / ∈ Output(H), thus, there exists E ∈ Ext(H) such that x / ∈ Concs(E). This contradicts Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be a system built over a theory T .
Let E ∈ Ext n (H) and let O = Th(E). It is clear that O is uniquely determined from E. Let us show that O is a naive option.
It is obvious that S ′ ⊆ S and D ′ ⊆ D. Now, for every x ∈ F there is an argument ( (x, ∅) , x) ∈ Arg(T ). By definition of undercutting, such argument has no conflict with any other argument. Thus, all arguments of this form belong to every naive extension, i.e., F ′ = F.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that ∃x ∈ CN(
is an argument of E. since x ∈ D ′ then, from the definition of Th(E), x must be used in at least an argument of E,
. Contradiction with conflict-freeness of E.
Let r ∈ S ′ ∪ D ′ . r is used in at least one argument, say a, of E. So, a has a sub-argument b = ( (x 1 , r 1 ) , . . . , (x n , r n ) , x n ) with r n = r and x n = Head(r). By closeness under sub-arguments (by Theorem 2), b is also an argument of E. From the definition of derivation schema, for every x ∈ Body(r), x = x i for some i s.t. 1 ≤ i < n. Thus, there is a sub-argument of b, and hence an argument in E and a derivation in O, for every x ∈ Body(r). This means that for every x ∈ Body(r),
But from the coherence of (F ′ , S ′′ , D ′′ ) it must be the case that ∄b ∈ E s.t. aR u b or bR u a. Indeed, suppose for example that aR u b and that
) and x ∈ D ′′ which contradicts the coherence of (F ′ , S ′′ , D ′′ ). We can show in a similar way that it must not be the case that bR u a. But, it this case E ∪ a is conflict-free. Contradiction with the fact that E is a naive extension.
Let E, E ′ ∈ Ext n (H) and NOption(E) = NOption(E ′ ). Let us show that
Let E ∈ Ext n (H). Since NOption(E) = Th(E) and from the definition of functions Th and Arg it is obvious that E ⊆ Arg(NOption(E)). Now let a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(NOption(E)). This means that a = (d, x) is constructed from NOption(E). So, x ∈ CN(NOption(E)) and Def(d) ⊆ Defs(NOption(E)). Suppose that a / ∈ E. Since E is a naive extension then there is b = (d ′ , x ′ ) ∈ E such that aR u b or bR u a. From b ∈ E we easily deduce that x ′ ∈ CN(NOption(E)) and Def(d ′ ) ⊆ Defs(NOption(E)). But then, from aR u b or bR u a, NOption(E) must be incoherent. Contradiction with the fact that NOption(E) is a naive option.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) be a system built over a theory T .
Let O = (F, S ′ , D ′ ) ∈ NOpt(T ) and let E = Arg(O). We prove that E is a maximal conflict-free set of Arg(T ). Suppose that there are two arguments a = (d, x) and b = (d ′ , x ′ ) in E s.t. aR u b, i.e., x ∈ Def(d ′ ). But since d and d ′ are derivation schemas for x and x ′ respectively in O we have:
Contradiction with the coherence of naive option O. E = Arg(O) is conflictfree. Now, suppose that E is not maximal. Thus there is E ′ ⊆ Arg(T ) s.t. E ⊂ E ′ and E ′ is a naive extension of H. From Theorem 3,
Since all the arguments that use exclusively rules from S ′ ∪ D ′ belong to E, every argument in E ′ \ E uses at least a rule r which is not in
F ′′ = F follows from the fact that Arg(O) contains every argument ( x, ∅ , x). Let x ∈ S ′′ (resp. x ∈ D ′′ ). x is used in at least an argument of Arg(O), so x ∈ S ′ (resp. x ∈ D ′ ). Thus, we have: S ′′ ⊆ S ′ and D ′′ ⊆ D ′ . Inversely, let x ∈ S ′ (resp. x ∈ D ′ ), since Body(x) ⊆ CN(O) (from the definition of a naive option), x must be used in at least one argument of Arg(O). Thus x ∈ F ′′ (resp. x ∈ D ′′ ). So, F ′ ⊆ F ′′ and D ′ ⊆ D ′′ . In summary, F = F ′′ , S ′ = S ′′ and D ′ = D ′′ , i.e., O = NOption(Arg(O)). By a similar reasoning, we obtain the same conclusion for the other case (there is x s.t. x ∈ S ′ 2 and x / ∈ S ′ 1 ) and for the case of defeasible rules.
Let
Proof of Corollary 2. Follows immediately from the bijection between naive options and naive extensions (Theorems 3 -4).
Proof of Corollary 3. Follows immediately from the bijection between naive options and naive extensions (Theorems 3 -4).
Proof of Theorem 5. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) s.t. Ext s (H) = ∅.
Let us show that for all E ∈ Ext s (H), there is a unique O ∈ SOpt(T ) s.t.
Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O).
Let E ∈ Ext s (H) and let Th(E) = (F ′ , S ′ , D ′ ). We can show that F ′ = F in a similar way as in Theorem 3, first point. We take O = (F, S, D ′ ) (we complete S ′ by the remaining strict rules). Clearly, O is uniquely determined from E. We have that Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)). Let us show that CN((F, S, D ′ )) = CN(Th(E)). To do so, it is sufficient to show that every rule r ∈ S \ S ′ is not applicable in (F, S ′ , D ′ ). Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is r ∈ S \ S ′ s.t. r is applicable in (F, Proof of Corollary 4. Follows immediately from the bijection between stable options and stable extensions (theorems 5 -6).
Proof of Corollary 5. Follows immediately from the bijection between stable options and stable extensions (theorems 5 -6).
Proof of Theorem 7. Let H = (Arg(T ), R u ) s.t. Ext p (H) = ∅.
Let us show that for all E ∈ Ext p (H), there is a unique O ∈ POpt(T ) s.t.
Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O).
